CO129-590-25 Accounts of events leading up to surrender and subsequent treatment of prisoners- etc 23-4-1942 - 28-9-1943 — Page 112

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General Crerar adds:-

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With information at my disposal concerning units of Force "C" and knowing professional ability and character of Commanding Officer, Brigadier Lawson, I would say that Force "C" was certainly fit to an attacking force, even in superior numbers, and to give a fine ac of itself by December 8. General Crerar says:-

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Information at my disposal during latter part of September, 1941, indicated that outbreak of hostilities with Japan was not imminent and that time would, in all probability, be available to carry out intensive, adequate and possible extensive training of Canadian forces at Hong Kong after their arrival.

General Stuart agrees with this.

The evidence relating to the training, equipment and personnel of the two battalions is fully examined in the Appendix. For reasons which there appear, I am satisfied that in respect of weapon training, as in respect of other matters, this selection cannot be justly impeached as affected by any error in judgment.

Third, of the steps taken to bring the units up to strength, including first reinforcements. The selection of the units made, it became necessary to provide "first reinforcements" for both battalions and to bring the Winnipeg Grenadiers up to strength. Both battalions were warned for service on October 9th and the ship which had been provided by the British Government to take the expedition to Hong Kong was to sail before the end of the month. In an interval of not more than two weeks it was necessary to obtain the required additions, as well as to attend to the multifarious tasks involved in equipping the expedition. It must be remembered that all these preparations had to go forward, not only with urgency, but also with extreme secrecy. It was decided to obtain the men needed for the Royal Rifles in Military District No. 2, with Headquarters in Toronto, and those for the Winnipeg Grenadiers in Military District No. 10, with Headquarters in Winnipeg.

All men who were added to the two battalions prior to the departure for Hong Kong volunteered for service overseas with the battalion to which they went. They were, in the case of each battalion, accepted as satisfactory by the Officer Commanding, or by officers designated by him. The steps taken by the battalion and district officers were taken under the direction of and were approved by National Defence Headquarters at Ottawa and, in particular, of and by Colonel P. Hennessy, the Director of Organization in the Adjutant- General's Department, upon whom devolved the immediate direction and responsibility for the task of bringing the units up to strength and providing first reinforcements, and who became the Senior Administrative Officer of the Expeditionary Force.

There were added to the Royal Rifles 154 men from Military District No. 2, of whom 52 came from the Midland Regiment and 102 came from Advanced Training Centres at Camp Borden. There were added to the Winnipeg Grenadiers, 282 men and 12 officers from Military District No. 10. In the Appendix I have examined in detail the training and qualifications of each group of the men added.

A period of sixteen weeks has been laid down as the standard period to be devoted to the training of an infantry recruit before sending him overseas. In individual cases and by reason of the exigencies of shipping, this standard has on occasion not been enforced. Of the men added to the strength of the Hong Kong expedition, all but about six per cent had undergone more than sixteen weeks military training after enlistment in the active army. As I have already said, all these men volunteered for service with the expedition and all were accepted as suitable by officers of the battalion to which they were going.

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A number of officers gave evidence of the great value of the personal selec- tion of men for a unit by competent officers of that unit. For example, Lieu- tenant-General McNaughton said (and with him General Crerar and General

art agreed):

If I were the Commanding Officer and had had the chance to select the men and know them individually-see that they were all right-I would not have worried very much whether they had completed the basic training or not, because character is the thing we lay most stress on, and, if they were people who were suitable in my judgment to incorporate in the battalion, I would have been perfectly happy to have had them. I would not have worried from the point of view of military efficiency one iota, because, if they are the right type of men, even on the voyage over I would have completed their individual training.

I accept this evidence of Generals McNaughton, Crerar and Stuart and of other officers to the like effect as of great weight in deciding upon the propriety of the steps taken to bring the force up to strength and to provide it with first reinforcements.

A considerable amount of evidence was directed to show the effect of adding to two well-trained battalions groups of lesser trained men numbering about six per cent of the strength of the two units. That evidence conclusively establishes that an efficient battalion is, and must be, capable of absorbing recruits, who have not fully completed their training, up to a much greater proportion of its strength than six per cent, without at all detracting from the efficiency of the battalion as a whole.

From the whole of the evidence (which is fully discussed in the Appendix) I have reached the conclusion that there was no unfairness either to the battalions, or to the expedition, as a whole, from the addition of this small percentage of men who had not fully completed the standard period of train- ing at the time they were accepted by the battalion officers. Nor have I any doubt that these men who volunteered for the expedition in order to enter upon active service would be quickly absorbed into their new units, or that in accepting them there was not any unfairness to the men themselves; and I am satisfied that the acceptance of these men had no detrimental effect upon the efficiency of either battalion. I have found no dereliction of duty or error in judgment in connection with the additions made to the strength of the two units.

In the course of my examination of the evidence I found that the inclusion of this small percentage of men was not the result of any shortage of fully trained men in Canada. It arose from the necessity of obtaining the men with great speed and secrecy and the impracticability in the time available of select- ing them from a larger number of training centres.

Four, of the general organization an ddispatch of the force, apart from the subject of mechanical transport. The facts are stated in the Appendix and they require no comment here.

Five, of mechanical transport. With regard to the mechanical transport of the force, consisting of 212 vehicles, the troopship, the Awatea, provided by the British authorities had not sufficient cargo space to take them. The War Office was most anxious that the troops should go on this ship, as another opportunity to sail was not likely to occur for two months. Shortly before the expedition sailed, space for the vehicles unexpectedly became available in an American ship and that ship sailed with the vehicles on November 4, but did not reach its destination before the outbreak of hostilities, as she was diverted by the United States naval authorities. Had she been allowed to follow her normal route, she would have reached Hong Kong before the Japanese attack opened. This miscarriage was not in any way due to any fault, or mistake, of any officer of the Canadian forces, or of any official of the Canadian Government.

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